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FOREWORD 
Felix B. Chang† 
Scholars have long observed a paradox in how we teach and write 
about trust law: in legal scholarship and the law school curriculum, 
trusts are classified within the law of donative transfers—even though 
in practice, trusts are used more as an instrument of business 
transactions. As John Langbein noted over 20 years ago, trusts hold far 
more in assets as vehicles for pension funds, mutual funds, and asset 
securitization than they do for gratuitous transfers.1 Yet trusts and 
estates scholars are as unfamiliar with business trusts as business law 
scholars are with personal trusts. Even after Robert Sitkoff sketched 
out a research agenda for business trusts a decade ago,2 scholars on 
both sides have not bridged the schism. 
To restart these conversations, the University of Cincinnati College 
of Law’s Corporate Law Center (the “Center”) convened its Annual 
Symposium (the “Symposium”) on the “Business Uses of Trusts.”3 As 
the Center’s 30th annual symposium, it was a momentous occasion, 
one the organizers decided to mark by tackling a complex and still 
relatively unexplored topic. We assembled a roster of speakers that 
was drawn more from academia than in recent years, with a view 
toward pushing conversations across the scholarly silos. As a 
reflection, this special issue of the University of Cincinnati Law 
Review features a diverse selection of essays that take up Professor 
Sitkoff’s challenge while surveying the ways that trusts have been put 
to use since then. 
The contributions to the Symposium explored several major themes. 
One was the foundational question of how business trusts have come 
to develop and why they have been overlooked. The keynote address 
by John Morley addressed this puzzle. Professor Morley, who in his 
writings has positioned the common law trust as an alternative 
 
† Professor and Co-Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I thank 
Sean Mangan, Lori Strait, and Jennie Edelstein for their hard work in organizing the Symposium. Thanks, 
too, to all the Symposium participants, the editors of the University of Cincinnati Law Review, and the 
fellows of the Corporate Law Center. 
 1. John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 
YALE L.J. 165 (1997). 
 2. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 31 
(2005). 
 3. For the full agenda, see UC Law School Symposium Examines Trusts in the Business World, 
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF LAW (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.uc.edu/news/articles/2019/02/n2069580.html [https://perma.cc/JJ3V-6NJT]. 
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corporate form,4 spoke about the role of the common law trust in 
commercial history. In this vein, Thomas Gallanis investigated the 
history of trust pedagogy. His contribution to this issue, Commercial 
Trusts in U.S. Legal Thought, challenges some of the explanations 
offered by Professor Langbein on the estrangement of commercial 
trusts from trust scholarship and pedagogy.5 Instead, Professor 
Gallanis traces this feature to a curricular reform at Columbia Law 
School in the 1920s that broke with Harvard’s tradition of teaching 
from appellate cases to offer education that approaches law through its 
“underlying political, economic, and social factors.”6 Other law 
schools quickly followed. Professor Gallanis, who is as much a 
comparativist and historian as a trusts and estates scholar,7 then offers 
five reasons for why law schools continued to combine trust law and 
succession law—reasons that are unique to the U.S. context. 
The natural question that arises, then, is whether trusts might be 
reintegrated into the business law curriculum and scholarship. If 
Columbia’s move had been precipitated by socioeconomic dynamics, 
surely today’s trends would prompt a re-evaluation of our approach to 
trusts. That brings up the second theme of the conference: the business 
uses of trusts in our time. Several of the contributions canvass those 
uses. 
The essays by Steven Schwarcz and Natalya Shnitser investigate 
two of the most common statutory trusts—particularly how they fit 
with common law notions of fiduciary duties. In Indenture Trustee 
Duties, Professor Schwarcz, one of the few scholars to have written on 
business trusts early on,8 mines the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the 
“TIA”) for guidance on the duties of trustees for bond investors.9 
Focusing on trustee duties prior to the default of securitized bond issues, 
he considers normative justifications associated with the securities realm, 
such as the relative sophistication between the counterparties and the 
efficiency of imposing an overlay of duties.10  Given the subtleties of bond 
investments, Professor Schwarcz concludes that trustees should only be 
 
 4. See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American 
Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145 (2016). 
 5. Thomas P. Gallanis, Commercial Trusts in U.S. Legal Thought: Historical Puzzles and Future 
Directions, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 843 (2020). 
 6. Id. at 848 (quoting A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW [OF] COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 312 
(Julius Goebel Jr., ed. 1955)). 
 7. See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The Contribution of Fiduciary Law, in The Worlds of the Trust 
(Lionel Smith ed. 2013). 
 8. Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 
58 BUS. LAW. 559, 568-69 (2003) 
 9. Steven L Schwarcz, Indenture Trustee Duties: The Pre-Default Puzzle, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 659 
(2020). 
 10. See id. at 667–68. 
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held to the pre-default duties specified in the bond indenture.11 In contrast, 
Professor Shnitser evaluates the role of the traditional fiduciary 
framework in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”)—and the mismatch between that traditional framework and 
defined contribution plans, which have eclipsed pensions funds.12 She 
notes that trust law “inadvertently” became the paradigm of governance 
for defined contribution plans, even though delineations between settlor 
and fiduciary do not map neatly onto such plans.13 Nonetheless, the 
adoption of the common law notions of the trust has led to perverse results 
such as judicial deference to employers and, simultaneously, lax 
monitoring by employees.14 
What unites the TIA and ERISA studies is the truism that context 
matters. Professors Schwarcz and Shnitser have each identified instances 
where common law trusts are inappropriate models for statutory 
“trustees.” For both bond issuances and defined contribution plans, if 
traditional fiduciary duties take on too much, the results can be 
counterproductive. 
The contributors are careful not to overreach in looking to trustee 
duties, reflecting the skepticism of courts toward fiduciary litigation as a 
panacea in business cases. Since the early business law cases, a common 
impulse has been to fill out the contours of partnership and corporate 
fiduciaries duty by analogizing to trusts—an impulse that has viewed 
trustee duties through too rose-tinted a set of glasses.15 The reality, 
however, is that trust law has taken the same libertarian turn as agency, 
partnership, and corporate law.16 With duties of care gutted and duties of 
loyalty circumscribed, common law trusts cannot stand as the paragon for 
business contexts. Thus, as Professor Shnitser points out, recent 
progressive reforms to retirement plans at the state level have 
supplemented or eschewed fiduciary principles for bright-line fee caps.17 
Business trusts are more accurately a collection of statutory trusts, each 
designed for a particular commercial purpose. Apart from pension funds 
and securitized bonds, these purposes might even be more sustainable 
than short-term profits, such as steering a business through market 
 
 11. Id. at 684. 
 12. Natalya Shnitser, The New Fiduciaries, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 685 (2020). 
 13. Id. at 690–91. 
 14. Id. at 692–93. 
 15. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928) (“A trustee is held to 
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”); In re Citigroup Inc Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 16. For a summary, see Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation and Transmission of 
Wealth, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 105–08 (2018). 
 17. Shnitser, supra note 12, at 700–05. 
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vagaries and succession planning. Such is the world that Susan Gary 
explores in her essay, The Oregon Stewardship Trust.18 In this piece, 
Professor Gary analyzes Oregon’s newly adopted statute on the 
stewardship trust, which provides a structure for steward-owned 
companies, where management focuses on a business’s purpose rather 
than its profits.19 Modeled on the noncharitable purpose trust of Section 
409 of the Uniform Trust Code,20 the statute provides a formal mechanism 
to ensure that a company’s operation hews closely to its mission by, 
among other things, vesting control in a trustee, trust enforcer, and 
stewardship committee, rather than officers and directors who can be 
ousted by outside investors.21 This structure is more responsive to Oregon 
businesses like the Organically Grown Company than the purpose trust of 
the UTC or other state statutes. 
 A hallmark of common law trusts is their flexibility, and statutory 
trusts have preserved this feature, utilizing the settlor–trustee–beneficiary 
structure to serve a variety of objectives. Far beyond Oregon, business 
trusts are also the preferred vehicle for sustainability-minded companies 
in Singapore, as Lee-ford Tritt and Ryan Scott Teschner reveal in The 
Rise of Business Trusts in Sustainable Neo-Innovative Economies.22 In 
fact, Singapore’s Code of Corporate Governance expressly incorporates 
“the interests of other [i.e., nonshareholder] stakeholders” into its 
definition of governance,23 which adheres to an investment mindset that 
prioritizes incremental wealth above excessive risk.24 Tritt and Teschner 
catalog the host of reasons—other than sociocultural differences—for the 
prevalence of business trusts in Singapore but not in the United States, 
where corporations reign. These reasons include (i) the success of 
predecessors to Singapore’s statutory business trusts, such as real estate 
investment trusts, (ii) aggressive marketing by law firm trust practices, 
and (iii) the general aversion to managerial entrenchment in the U.S. (to 
which Professor Gary’s study on Oregon stewardship trusts stands as an 
interesting counterpoint).25 
The third theme that cuts across the essays in this issue is the myriad 
 
 18. Susan N. Gary, The Oregon Stewardship Trust: A New Type of Purpose Trust That Enables 
Steward-Ownership of a Business, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 707 (2020). 
 19. Id. at 707. 
 20. Section 409 is the basis of honorary trusts for purposes such as the care of a settlor’s gravesite. 
Relatedly, Section 408, which Professor Gary cites as another precursor of the Oregon statute, provides 
for the care of a settlor’s pet. 
 21. See Gary, supra note 18 at 727. 
 22. Lee-ford Tritt & Ryan Scott Teschner, The Rise of Business Trusts in Sustainable Neo-
Innovative Economies, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 735 (2020). 
 23. Id. at 761 (citing CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 2 (Sing. 2018)). 
 24. See id. at 762. 
 25. Id. at 763-64. 
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of comparative perspectives on the topic. The contributors undertake 
comparisons of business trusts in different markets (e.g., pooled 
investments versus purposeful stewardship companies) and across 
jurisdictions (e.g., between the U.S. and Singapore). To that end, Lusina 
Ho examines trust and investment companies in China,26 adding to the 
literature on trusts in civil law countries and, more significantly, trusts as 
a financing instrument in China.27 Professor Ho’s essay, Business Trusts 
in China, shows that the statutory framework of the Chinese Trust Law, 
as well as regulations on the administration of trust companies and 
collective trust plans, fails on both micro and macroscopic levels: the 
framework fails not only to protect investors but also to rein in a bloated, 
systemically risky shadow banking sector. To avert sociopolitical 
instability, governmental entities bail trust companies out of bad 
investments, and trust plans leave investors with the impression of 
implicit government guarantees. Consequently, the financial markets 
cannot sort out sound investments from foolhardy ones, and moral 
hazards augment the likelihood of systemic collapse.28 Among other 
flaws, trusts in China lack the basic beneficiary protections and market 
pressures of trusts elsewhere.29 Unlike the other cases, business trusts in 
Chinese finance fall short not because of vestigial notions from common 
law trusts but because of design flaws and the lack of an administrative 
and enforcement ecosystem to hold fiduciaries accountable. 
Finally, Eric Chaffee articulates a collaboration theory of the business 
trust. Building on his prior work,30 Professor Chaffee extends a theory of 
the corporate form that he has been tinkering with to the realm of business 
trusts.31 Yet he is careful not to borrow wholesale from the corporate 
context; as Professor Chaffee recognizes, corporations and trusts have 
traveled different historical and doctrinal paths.32 The collaboration 
theory can be summarized as “a narrowly focused collaboration . . . [for 
the] gain of the beneficiary through the action of a trustee.”33  Applied to 
business trusts, this leads to some counterintuitive results, such as wealth 
 
 26. Lusina Ho, Business Trusts in China: A Reality Check, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 767 (2020). 
 27. See, e.g., The Worlds of the Trust (Lionel Smith ed. 2013); Lusina Ho, Trust Law in China  
(2003); Lusina Ho, Rebecca Lee, and Jin JinPing, Trust Law in China: A Critical Evaluation of its 
Conceptual Foundation, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
80, 85-91 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., 2013). In fact, much of this literature on trust law in China has 
come from Professor Ho herself. 
 28. See Ho, supra note 26, at 777–79. 
 29. See id. at 791 (singling out “the ring-fencing of trust property, the attribution of profits and 
losses to the beneficiary, and the trustee’s duty to provide accounts”). 
 30. Some of it, incidentally, developed in prior symposia. 
 31. Eric C. Chaffee, A Theory of the Business Trust, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 797 (2020). 
 32. Id. at 802–13. 
 33. Id. at 841-42. 
5
Chang: Foreword
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
658 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
maximization for beneficiaries and trustee primacy.34 In the corporate 
context, Professor Chaffee was more comfortable with his theory 
justifying broader concerns—namely, corporate social responsibility.35 
Professor Gary, too, may challenge any assertion that statutory trusts 
focus exclusively on wealth maximization.36 However, Professor 
Chaffee’s essay, A Theory of Business Trusts, moves the conversation on 
business trusts beyond the comparative (e.g., historical comparisons to 
corporations, comparisons across industries, and comparisons across 
jurisdictions) and into the theoretical, where the literature is thinner. And 
in the end, the different approaches of the contributors illustrate the 
flexibility and adaptability of trusts to business settings. 
 
 34. See id. at 834, 837. 
 35. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 353 
(2017). 
 36. For my part, I have always found theoretical debates about the corporate form to be a little 
outcome-determinative. With business trusts, surely there may be collaborations that are less focused on 
the economic gains of beneficiaries and yet still be wholly consistent with the theory. I look forward to 
Professor Chafee’s further development of this theory to reconcile the seemingly divergent outcomes in 
the corporate and trust contexts. 
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